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LABOR DEPT. INSPECTOR GENERAL:
SAFETY AGENCY DID NOT DO ALL INSPECTIONS
AT ONE-SEVENTH OF NATION’S COAL MINES
The Bush government’s Mine Safety
and Health Administration, charged with overseeing job
safety conditions at the nation’s coal mines, did not
undertake all four of the yearly required inspections
at 107 of the 731--or one-seventh--of them, a new
audit says.
The audit was released late in the afternoon of
Friday Nov. 16 by the Labor Department’s Inspector
General, in an attempt to downplay its coverage. The
audit said MSHA failed to do all the inspections due
to short-staffing and that agency “management did not
place adequate emphasis on ensuring the inspections
were completed and the reported completion rate was
accurate.
“Specifically, the number of inspectors assigned to
the 11 Coal Mine Safety & Health districts was not
commensurate with the mine activity at the districts,
and management’s monitoring of inspection completions
was not effective,” the IG added.
“Missed or incomplete inspections place miners at
risk because hazardous conditions in the mines may not
be identified and corrected,” the IG said flatly.
The critical report received added emphasis after two
fatal explosions and collapses at Utah’s Crandall
Canyon mine killed six miners and three rescuers,
including an MSHA inspector. The IG is continuing a
separate probe of MSHA’s role at Crandall Canyon.
That includes why MSHA approved the company’s faulty
plan to mine the pillars of coal that supported the
mine’s roof.
The audit echoes longtime criticisms of the agency by
the United Mine Workers. UMW President Cecil Roberts
has repeatedly said MSHA administrators under the GOP
Bush regime disregard safety issues in deference to
mine owners and operators.
But the Inspector General said MSHA’s problems are
widespread. “Because inspection deficiencies
identified in our audit were caused by weaknesses in
policies and procedures, it is likely similar problems
existed in all 11 CMS&H districts,” it adds.
“In fact, MSHA found similar inspection and
supervisory oversight problems during internal reviews
of three fatal underground mining accidents at the
Sago, Aracoma, and Darby mines,” last year, the IG
noted. The Sago blast, in early January, killed 12
miners, started a year in which coal mine fatalities
rose dramatically and led to passage of new, tougher
mine safety legislation.
The IG also said MSHA “could not provide adequate
assurance” that all the critical inspections of
various components of a coal mine, including mine
owners’ plans for removing coal, were done each time an MSHA
inspector visited a mine.
“Our review of 21 inspections of active mines
disclosed that for the 68 selected inspection
activities we tested, 15 percent were not documented
as having been performed because management did not
require inspectors to document all critical inspection
activities performed.” Crandall Canyon was inspected
the required seven times between Oct. 1, 2005 and the
explosion this past August, but “16 percent of the 68
selected critical inspection activities tested for the
7 inspections were not documented as actually having
been performed.”
In one case, the Crandall Canyon inspector certified
he evaluated the mine’s roof control plan four months
before actually inspecting the roof, the IG said.
Pillars of coal, which were being mined at the owner’s
orders, gave way during the first explosion and buried
the six miners.
The IG sent seven recommendations for improvements to
MSHA, but the agency’s chief, an appointee of
anti-worker GOP President George W. Bush, did not
agree with all of them.
One recommendation said the MSHA administrator
“should ensure inspection resources are commensurate
with the mining activity in the coal districts.” MSHA
replied that it is hiring and training 270 more
inspectors.
The IG also called for effective monitoring of
“inspection completions,” said the agency should
develop policies and procedures to “calculate the
regular safety and health inspection completion rate,
and ensuring the inspection data used is correct.”
Another recommendation is that “all critical
inspection activities are documented as performed, or
(as) not applicable at the mines being inspected.”
And the IG said MSHA field office supervisors should
“certify inspections are thorough and complete.
“In response, DOL’s Assistant Secretary for Mine
Safety and Health disagreed with the accuracy and
presentation of some of the audit results and
questioned the audit methodology for assessing the
thoroughness of inspections. He stated that limited
enforcement time should be placed primarily on
identifying and abating hazards rather than
documentation and paperwork,” the Inspector General
noted.
“The assistant secretary did not agree to document
when a critical inspection activity was not applicable
at a mine. As an alternative, he suggested adding a
disclaimer statement to reports. He did not directly
address our recommendation to require field office
supervisors to certify inspections are thorough before
being counted as complete.” The IG called the
“disclaimer statement” inadequate.
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